Pragmatism and adaptability are the leading qualities of Finland's European policy, behavioural traits influenced by Cold War experiences. According to the political elite, national interests can be best pursued through active and constructive participation in EU decision-making. Finnish integration policy stands thus in quite striking contrast to the EU policies of Denmark and Sweden (and of course Norway and Iceland), both of which have been far less supportive of further integration. Re-assessing this traditional image of Finland, we argue that beneath the veil of domestic consensus were strong disagreements over Europe, both regarding policy and procedure, or how EU was approached domestically. The euro crisis has certainly shaken the foundations of this pro-integrationist approach, bringing to the surface the internal divisions that exist among both political parties and the public over Europe and even affecting EU level bargaining. Moreover, the current war in Ukraine has led to questions about Finland's foreign and security policy, especially in relation to Russia and to what extent Finnish external relations are tied to European level decisions. Despite such destabilizing tendencies, we nonetheless argue against major changes to Finnish EU policy: Finland joined the Union for economic and security reasons, and, if anything, the euro crisis and the Ukrainian war have underlined the importance of the European framework for advancing national interests. At the same time there is no return to the pre-2010 era, with the public and party-political contestation over the EU setting stronger constraints to government behaviour in Brussels.
Introduction
Finland's integration policy can be characterized as flexible and constructive. Successive governments have constantly underscored the importance of taking part in decisions concerning Finland. According to the political elite, national interests can be best pursued through active and constructive participation in European Union (EU) decision-making. Underlying this stance is a conviction that strong and efficient European institutions and common rules can best protect the rights and interests of smaller member states, as intergovernmental processes tend to favour the larger member states. Pragmatism and adaptability are the leading qualities of national EU policy, behavioural traits influenced by Cold War experiences. This also means a pragmatic attitude towards the definition of 'national interest': what is seen to be in the national interests may well change in the process of integration, or 'Europeanisation'.
Finnish integration policy stands thus in quite striking contrast to the EU policies of Denmark and Sweden (and of course Norway and Iceland), both of which have been far less supportive of further integration. Interestingly, such a divergence was not foreseen. Some had predicted, especially after the divisive EU membership referendum of October 1994,that Finland would follow the path of Denmark with its cautious integration policy. Others expected an inter-Nordic division to go between, on the one hand, Denmark as a footnote country, and, on the other, Sweden and Finland as adaptive countries and even potential 'model pupils' (Mouritzen 1993) . In the end, it was Finland that appeared to jump in from the cold, from a neutral outlier to a country aiming at the very 'core' of the Union. Sweden did not follow. A good illustration of the difference in attitude was the EMU question. Finland is the only Nordic country that belongs to the euro zone, with the single currency adopted as a done deal and without much political contestation. Sweden interpreted the same situation differently taking the political freedom to postpone its entry to the EMU, staying out of euro. (Ojanen 2004) 2 Another illustration of adaptation was the reformulation of neutrality. Both Finland and Sweden reformulated their neutrality policies as military non-alignment and declared it as compatible with EU membership and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Both also strived to show activism in this field and committed considerable resources to it, actually bringing integration forward. The change was, however, particularly striking for Finland, as it had earlier on approached security cooperation with great caution, avoiding binding commitments and political cooperation. (Ojanen 2000 Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003; Tiilikainen 2006; Raunio 2015) .
Re-assessing this traditional image of Finland as an adaptive and integrationist EU country, we argue that beneath the veil of domestic consensus were strong disagreements over Europe. This applied to both national integration policy and to procedure or how EU affairs were handled in Finland. In order to put our argument into contextual perspective, we first explain the reasons why Finland joined the EU and the importance attached to consensual mode of decision-making before providing evidence of the changes. The euro crisis has certainly shaken the foundations of this prointegrationist approach, bringing to the surface the internal divisions that exist among both political parties and the public over Europe. In particular, the crisis ushered in an era of unprecedented domestic politicization of Europe, with this contestation over euro zone bailout measures and the further development of integration affecting the work of national political institutions and cabinet formation and even EU level decision-making. Moreover, the current war in Ukraine has led to questions about Finland's foreign policy, especially in relation to Russia and to what extent Finnish external relations are tied to European level decisions. Internationally, this has provoked some discussion on Finland's changing image within the Union, while the domestic debates have clearly revealed the tensions between those favouring a more supranational EU and those more in line with an intergovernmental vision of Europe.
Joining the 'West' for economic, security and cultural reasons
When the Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland wasted no time in seizing the opportunity to become fully engaged in European integration. While joining the European Community (EC) was not on the political agenda during the Cold War, Finnish industry, especially the influential wood processing sector, had expressed its preferences by exporting heavily to Western Europe (Väyrynen 1993 ). Finland took part in the negotiations on the formation of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1990 and joined it in 1994 (Ojanen 2004) . Application for EC membership followed suit in March 1992. Once the membership application was made, a broad majority of the national decision-making elite -government, parliamentary majority, trade unions and employers' organisations, main political parties, the president, most of the media -emerged in favour of EU membership. Finland joined the EU from the beginning of 1995, following a membership referendum held in October 1994 in which 57 % voted in favour of entering the Union (Pesonen 1994; Arter 1995; Jenssen et al. 1998 ).
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The broad support for membership shown by the political elites before the referendum is explained by both economic interests and security considerations. Economic factors were strongly emphasized in the membership debates. Finland is heavily dependent on trade, and the demise of the communist bloc increased trade dependence on the EU countries. Apart from trade concerns, the heavy recession of the early 1990s, including the instability in monetary policy and the devaluation of markka, further convinced the industry and the trade unions about the importance of joining the Union. The only significant interest group campaigning against membership was The Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners, a position explained by the anticipated negative impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the farming sector. 3 Only two minor Eduskunta parties were against membership: the Christian Democrats (then as the Christian League) and the Rural Party (the predecessor of the Finns Party). The Left Alliance and the Green League were so divided over the issue that they decided not to adopt positions either for or against membership.
In addition to any lessons learned from history and the Cold War, the rather uncertain political situation in Russia brought security concerns to the fore. While security policy considerations were initially downplayed during the referendum campaign, there is no doubt that the security dimension was a key factor behind the decision of both the elite and the voters to support EU membership.
Indeed, the importance accorded to security policy is arguably what distinguishes the Finnish case from the other Nordic countries. It was because of security considerations that Finland could not have joined the EU any earlier. Once an EU member, Finland gave great importance to the new provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on CFSP and the security-enhancing impact of membership.
The quest towards the very 'core' of the Union also signalled a wish to be associated with the 'right' reference group: not with the reluctant Nordic neighbours, but rather, the pro-integrationist Benelux countries, or with Germany. (Ojanen 2004: 161-162.) Moreover, there was a broader cultural argument about (re-)joining the West. While the pro-EU camp argued that by joining the Union Finland would merely be maintaining or consolidating its place among west European countries, there is little doubt that especially among foreign observers the 'western' identity of Finland had been far less clear. Indeed, the significance of EU membership for Finland should not be underestimated, for it clearly constituted a key element in the 'process of wholesale re-identification on the international stage' (Arter 2000: 691) .
The importance of domestic consensus
The Finnish political system is often characterized as consensual. Decision-making is pragmatic and based on broad consultation with key interest groups, not least with the main corporatist actors, the trade unions and the employers' organisations. The shape of the Finnish party system, with no party as a rule winning more than 25 % of the votes in Eduskunta (the unicameral national legislature) parliamentary elections, also facilitates consensual governance and ideological convergence between all the parties aspiring to enter the government. Cabinets are typically majority coalitions that bring together parties from the left and the right. The dividing line between government and opposition has increased in significance as a result of recent constitutional reforms, but the pragmatic and consensual style of politics still largely prevails, particularly in EU and foreign policy matters. (E.g., Arter 2006; 2009; Karvonen 2014; Ruostetsaari 2015) From the start of EU membership until the outbreak of the euro crisis in spring 2010 Finland used to have a relatively broad consensus about Europe among its political parties. The divisive nature of the EU membership referendum held in 1994, however, indicated that the commitment to integration which prevailed among the political parties was not shared to the same extent by the electorate. According to Eurobarometers Finns are more sceptical of integration than the average EU citizens. In addition to generally low levels of public support for integration, the Finnish electorate seems to be particularly worried over lack of influence of small member states in EU governance. There has thus been a notable lack of congruence between the citizens and the political parties, with most parties considerably more supportive of the EU than their supporters (Mattila & Raunio 2005; 2012) . Hence it is not surprising that overall the Finnish parties kept a fairly low profile in integration matters, with also the rules of the national EU coordination system -based on building broad domestic elite consensus, including often between the government and opposition parties, which can arguably be translated into additional influence in EU level bargainingcontributing to the depoliticization of European issues (Raunio 2005; Hyvärinen & Raunio 2014) . 4 Consensus on foreign and security policy has traditionally been even stronger. Finland is a small country and in many senses dependent on stable and good international relations. Underlining the Finnish appreciation of consensus is the belief that such a small country is vulnerable if it shows internal differences of views, or cleavages concerning its foreign and security policy. Such cleavages could be used by outsiders to damage its negotiation position, and they might also be encouraged from the outside, thus destabilising Finnish politics. Therefore, the tradition has been not to debate foreign and security policy very much in the open. Efforts at actually stopping or restraining the debate with the argument that "it is not the right time for discussion" have not been rare, particularly when it comes to the Security and Defence White Papers by the government or NATO membership. A recent example would be the plea of President Sauli Niinistö to party leaders that NATO would not be taken up in the debates before the 2015 Eduskunta elections.
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The importance of consensus has stretched to cover also CFSP and the understanding that EU membership is important for Finnish security, even the view that the stronger the EU is in this field, 4 It also appears that until the current euro crisis the EU did not become as salient an issue as in the other Nordic countries, leaving thus parties more freedom to execute their preferred strategies. In contrast to the other Nordic countries, there were in Finland fewer issues around which to wage anti-EU campaigns (like the euro in Sweden and Denmark or fisheries policy in Norway). 5 The Finnish broadcasting company YLE in its news item on this meeting reported the president to have concluded that the parties shared a common view implying that none of them was proposing membership application but neither were they ruling such possibility out (http://yle.fi/uutiset/presidentti_niinisto_tapasi_puoluejohtajat_nato-hakemus_ei_ole_ajankohtainen/7700687). the better it is for Finland. Overall, the time Finland has been a member of the EU has been a period of positive developments in the neighbourhood and diversification of external relations, including of views on Finland's policies. This has contributed to a certain relaxation of mood. Together with the parliamentarisation of foreign policy that resulted from the constitutional change in 2000, more possibilities for genuine debate have been created. Yet, the recent grave problems in relations with Russia and the deteriorating security situation in the region is a factor that may make this growing pluralism again a potential security problem in itself, leading to highlighting the need for consensus even more than before.
'Special relationship' with Russia and the new European foreign and security policy
For centuries, Finland has been a 'borderland' in between east and west, as a part of Sweden, as part of Russia, and then from 1917 on, as an independent state trying to find its position between east and west (Tiilikainen 1998; Alapouro 2004) foreign policy was personally identified with the president, who was more or less visibly supported by political elites within the Soviet Union. Political debate and contestation on foreign policy were rare during this era of 'compulsory consensus' that placed a premium on maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union (Arter 1987 ).
Concerns about national security influenced voting behaviour in the 1994 membership referendum, but at the same time it was understandable that many commentators in Finland and abroad questioned whether the 'special relationship' with Russia -relationship which also in economic terms had been very important for Finland -would hinder Finland's participation in CFSP. Others in turn argued that even when operating in the EU context, Finland should strive to maintain strong bilateral relations with Moscow. Hence the compatibility between Finnish foreign policy and the CFSP had to be proven for both domestic and European audiences. One important part of this compatibility was the understanding that the CFSP did not necessitate altering relations with neighbours, i.e., with Russia, and that defence decisions -should defence policy come to be discussed in the future -would be based on unanimity (Ojanen 2008) .
To the member states, demonstration of good intentions as to the CFSP was in order. Seen from within the EU, Finland belonged to a group of neutral countries. As candidate countries, they were looked at with some suspicion: many member states thought these countries might not be willing to contribute to the new foreign and security policy and the possibility of a common defence policy in formation, but might in fact try to hamper it. Austria, Finland and Sweden did have to sign a special declaration confirming that they would be constructive participants. (Ojanen 1998: 292-293 ) Of these three countries, Finland quickly adopted a particularly positive rhetoric about the EU's security-enhancing impact. The government's Security and Defence White Paper of 1995 went as far as to state that Union membership will help Finland to repel any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure. Furthermore, it displayed the idea of a 'model pupil' that by its own loyalty ensures the others' support: "by sharing in these collective efforts, Finland can expect support from other members for its own aspirations and for its position." (Ojanen 2008: 58-60) .
Together with Sweden, Finland started its membership in a remarkably active way: in the preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty, they were already active in proposing to add the Petersberg tasks, or tasks of crisis management, to the treaty. Once accomplished, both countries also showed generosity in committing civilian and military capabilities to the EU, and later on, they have actively participated in its various crisis management operations as well as the Battle Groups (Ojanen 2000; 2008) . The basic reason for this activism was no doubt to spell the doubts about their credibility as partners in this field. Secondarily, there was the idea that multilateralism might indeed strengthen Finnish security: the new understanding gained ground that Finland might be in a stronger position as an EU member than what it was alone, and this applied also to relations with Russia.
At the same time, Finland tried to influence the EU's views and policies on Russia. Finland's early membership years were also characterised by activism in engaging the EU in northern affairs. The initiative for a "Northern Dimension" of the EU, presented in 1997, was a way for Finland to ensure that the EU would not lose sight of its northernmost regions in the wake of what looked like an imminent new enlargement to the east. Even more importantly, it was a way for Finland to insert its interests when it comes to the relations between the EU and Russia, or to 'customise its Union' in this field (Ojanen 1999) . At that point, Finland was the only EU member country with a border with Russia, and Finland soon also found itself in a position where its expertise on Russia was called for, the drafting of the common strategy on Russia in 1999 being one example (Haukkala & Ojanen 2011 ). The general interest towards Russia in the EU was low, and the Finnish emphases on positive interdependence and inclusion of non-EU partners, Russia but also others, hardly met opposition (Ojanen 2000) .
While the early years of membership entailed diverse and significant adaptation to EU foreign Later on, increasing Russian assertiveness and rivalry in the neighbourhood further accentuated this tendency. The internal divisions between EU member states on Russia become more pronounced, as the overall security situation deteriorated, bringing national interest to the foreground.
The euro crisis: politicization of EU affairs
Overall, considering the quite Eurosceptical public opinion and the divisions inside parties, there was a societal demand or at least potential for more contestation over EU and national integration policy. The domestic politicization of the euro crisis, coinciding with the 2011 Eduskunta election campaign, was thus perhaps not that surprising, but it certainly has changed the nature of national EU discussion and has even affected European level decision-making.
Economic factors played a key role in the decision to join the Union, and, if anything, the euro crisis seems to have further convinced at least the political and economic elites of the values of internal market and monetary stability. As one of the euro zone countries with triple-A rating, In the run-up to the 2011 Eduskunta elections the problems affecting the euro zone triggered heated debates, and the EU -or more precisely the role of Finland in the bailout measures -became the main topic of the campaign. The decision to rescue Greece from its near bankruptcy and the related euro stabilization measures resulted in unexpectedly heated debates in the Eduskunta, and when, just before the elections, first Ireland and then Portugal followed the path of Greece and required bailout measures, the debate only intensified. It is fair to say that no other EU matter has produced similar tensions in Finland since joining the Union. While the opposition parties, as well as a notable share of backbenchers from the governing parties, were clearly angered by the EU's response to the crisis, the debates were also strongly influenced by the upcoming elections. The more Eurosceptic parties (the Finns Party, the Christian Democrats and the Left Alliance) and the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, led the attack on the government. The Social Democrats, perhaps not to be outdone by the Finns Party's EU critique, adopted a high-profile position against lending money to Greece without bilateral collaterals, and the opposition parties in general voted against the aid measures.
Particularly the Finns Party had an electoral incentive to capitalize on the crisis. It is the only party represented in the Eduskunta that has consistently been opposed to European integration (but without ever demanding Finland's exit from the EU) -and also the only party which has systematically used the EU as a central part of its campaigns and political discourse. The Finns Party has forcefully attacked the consensual modes of decision-making and demanded public debates about Europe, calling for an end to 'one truth' politics. Indeed, it was the 'outsider' position which enabled the Finns Party to benefit from these developments. As the party was not part of the consensual arrangements, it could attack the existing status quo and the bailout measures with more legitimacy and credibility than its competitors.
The election result was nothing short of extraordinary, producing major changes in the national The main effects were indeed felt at home, both in the political institutions and in public debate.
Turning first to the government, the euro crisis clearly politicized and livened up debates in the ministerial EU committee (officially the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs), the main intra-cabinet forum for EU matters (Hyvärinen & Raunio 2014 The party adopted its current English name in August 2011. Until then it had been known as the True Finns. According to the party leader, Timo Soini, the new simpler name is intended to emphasize the fact that the party represents ordinary citizens. Soini also felt that the old name had an extreme right or nationalistic slant to it. The exact translation of the Finnish name of the party, Perussuomalaiset, would be 'common Finns' or 'ordinary Finns'. The increased contestation has influenced also government formation. In 2011 the Finns Party was close to joining the cabinet, but according to Timo Soini, the long-standing party chair, it was impossible to participate in a government that was committed to further euro zone rescue measures.
However, after another strong election result in the 2015 Eduskunta elections, with the Finns Party finishing second in terms of seats and winning 17.7 % of the votes, Soini guided his party to the new right-leaning cabinet that also includes the Centre Party and the National Coalition. With his eyes on post-election coalition formation bargaining, during the campaign Soini had assured voters that the EU and potential bailouts would not be obstacles to his party entering the government. The new Prime Minister, Juha Sipilä, needs also to look over his shoulders given that the Centre has been internally divided over European integration ever since EU membership entered the domestic political agenda in the early 1990s. Two-thirds of Centre supporters voted against membership in the 1994 referendum, and the rank-and-file continue to be sceptical of further integration. The party's parliamentary group also contains diverse views on Europe, and the generally speaking pro-EU Sipilä may thus be under pressure not to appear too soft when representing Finland in Brussels.
The European section of the government programme is certainly more critical of integration than the programmes of previous cabinets, with Finland seeking 'less, but better and lighter, regulation than at present.' The programme emphasizes strongly that each euro area country is responsible for its own economy, and 'EMU should not be developed through such deepening of economic coordination which would lead to an expansion of joint responsibility'. Sipilä's cabinet is thus 'opposed to increasing Finland's liabilities in handling the euro crisis' and that 'if the European Stability Mechanism must still be used, it should be done only within the framework of the mechanism's current capacity and capital structure'. 8 Hence it was not surprising that Finland was in the summer of 2015 among those countries that were most critical of a new Greek bailout package. 9 In the end the government, including the Finns Party, swallowed the bitter pill and accepted the bailout deal, not least because they realized that under ESM rules Finland could not alone bloc decision-making.
Overall, the euro crisis was a turning point in Finnish EU policy, with party-political conflict and public contestation that clearly constrains the cabinet in EU level bargaining, at least in euro zone decision-making. It may have strengthened similar tendencies in foreign and security policy as well, a field in which the original integration zeal started to show signs of change much earlier, but where stepping out of the consensus tradition is relatively much harder still.
The crisis in Ukraine: reconsidering the utility of CFSP Nonetheless, Finland has supported the EU line, with the government and President Sauli Niinistö underlining that there is no other option. The active role of Niinistö during the crisis is also interesting because of the dual leadership system, with Finland's foreign policy co-led by the president and the government (Raunio 2012a ). The system is often linked with the distinction between national and European foreign policy. While the government is in charge of the CFSP, the president is seen to take the lead in national foreign policy, or bilateral relations.
Would Russia even be a factor that makes Finland turn away from the common EU policy line?
Signs of questioning the efficiency and suitability of the sanctions can be found, even though the general support for the EU decisions is officially repeated over and over again. What is interesting, though, is how the debate has changed. Russia plays an active role: seeking for internal split within domestic debate has changed, becoming at times quite heated as the politicians accuse each other of either entering a 'grey area' with too many concessions to Russia or of a EU zeal that is dangerous for Finnish interests and, in the end, its security.
Similarly, the new government programme seeks to underline the support for common policies while marking the space for bilateralism. On Russia, it says: 'The improvement of relations between Russia and the EU would reinforce the security and economy of Europe as a whole. This cooperation must be based on respect for international law and international commitments', and, 'Russia is an important neighbour for Finland. Finland complies with the European Union's common positions on Russia and also maintains diverse bilateral relations.' The overall context of Finnish security policy reveals the 'order' of the 'reference groups', with the Nordic neighbours on top: 'The Nordic countries, the European Union -also as a security community, NATO partnership, the OSCE and the UN form the framework for Finland's international cooperation. In addition, Finland will maintain good bilateral relations with other countries.' When it comes to security and defence, Finland preserves its national leeway in its foreign and security policy decisions. The programme states that Finland is a militarily non-allied state which is engaged in a practical partnership with NATO and it maintains the option to seek NATO membership. 13 When looking at how Finland has scored in comparison to other member countries in EU foreign policy, it appears that its influence has been in decline for some time already. The Foreign Policy Scorecards from 2010 to 2015 14 also show that the overall profile of Finland in CFSP has increasingly diverted from that of Sweden. Finland's activism and influence has been declining, while Sweden has become the most influential member country after the large member states. This also includes relations with Russia, where Sweden has had a consistently active profile (human rights etc.). In this period and according to the scorecard methodology, Finland has not been hampering the CFSP, either. As shown in the above, however, in some situations Finland might be inclined to identify itself with those that want rather 'less' than 'more' Europe.
Concluding discussion
Considering the relatively narrow majority in favour of joining the EU in the referendum held in The divisions have extended to cover even foreign and security policy, surprisingly so, as Finland was expected to show more caution and restrain due to its past tradition of neutrality and geographical position. There is now more domestic debate about both the substance of EU external relations and the difficulties in reconciling Finnish interests with EU's common policy line. It seems that it is more legitimate than before to stress national interests and bilateral ties, particularly in relations with Russia. Moreover, the current budget cuts planned by the government that hit especially development aid but also crisis management activities have been interpreted as diverting
Finland away from a 'Nordic' profile but also international credibility, showing lack of responsibility and too strong an emphasis on national interest. They may also signal diminished activism in the future. Overall, there is now more contestation over integration, and importantly much of this conflict takes place in public -in the plenary debates in the Eduskunta and in printed and electronic media. This is certainly a highly positive development when considering that Europe as an issue had remained depoliticized in Finland for such a long time. The more critical domestic climate on Europe has also impacted on EU level bargaining. Increased contestation means more coverage and public scrutiny of national EU policy, and this in turn implies less room for manoeuvre for the cabinet. The mandates of the Eduskunta are considered politically binding on the government, and there are signs that the EAC is imposing stricter mandates. The Finnish cabinet is certainly more constrained by both the parliament and public opinion then before, but it is difficult to ascertain whether this is purposeful strategy in line with the 'Schelling Conjecture' (Schelling 1960) , according to which an executive whose hands are tied by a domestic ratification constraint such as a parliamentary veto can negotiate more favourable outcomes than an unconstrained executive.
So, what has changed? Has the pragmatic, flexible, adaptive and constructive member state unexpectedly turned into a rigid and critical one? To some extent yes, but the basic equation remains the same: Finland joined the EU for economic and security reasons, and, if anything, the euro crisis and the Ukrainian war have underlined the importance of the European framework for advancing national interests -but significantly, these national interests are now emphasized more, subject to increased domestic contestation, and defended more vigorously in Brussels. Of course one can say that this is more a matter of political rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences: after all, in the end the Finnish governments have, although with some reservations, supported various euro area coordination instruments and bailout packages. There is also no systematic evidence of Finnish governments acting tougher in other policy areas in EU level bargaining. However, change is already evident. In terms of EU level bargaining, flexibility may still prevail in less salient issues, but where national (publicly defined) interests are at stake, Finnish governments are bound to show less willingness for compromises than before. In terms of policy, what can be expected from Finland in these circumstances is low-political pragmatic cooperation geared towards economic growth rather than big reforms or supporting further centralization.
Domestically the changes are probably more profound. It is plausible to argue that there is no return to the pre-euro crisis era consensus over Europe. Most political parties, including all three current cabinet parties, and their electorates are divided over both integration and specific EU-related policy issues such as immigration, euro zone coordination instruments or relations with Russia. These issues are likely to feature prominently in both national and EU level debates in the next few years.
